The SOLS change variable used in this paper (solsch) uses a more inclusive conceptualization of changes in source of leader support than the larger data project. Here we code as SOLS changes not only all leader transitions that we identify as SOLS changes in the larger data set but also leadership transitions in nondemocracies that are minor SOLS changes. (In other words, solsch is coded 1 if solschange=1 | (solsminchange=1 & dem=0) in the CHISOLS data). Minor SOLS changes in nondemocracies occur when a leader transition coincides with the transition of a "pure" autocratic regime into a hybrid that includes features of the formerly pure type and transitions from a hybrid into a related pure type. For example, a transition from a military leader to a military-single-party leader is coded as a minor SOLS change, as is a transition from a personalist-military leader to a military leader. (The CHISOLS coder manual provides more information on these cases.) The reason we opted to treat so-called minor SOLS changes in nondemocracies similarly to regular SOLS changes in any regime for the purposes of this paper is that these leader transitions should also be expected to be accompanied by significant changes in underlying preferences and interests that determine foreign policy.
I. Additional Coding Information:
Our spatial-temporal domain covers all independent states with populations greater than 500,000 from . The only country with a population larger than 500,000 excluded is Kosovo, which was only independent for one year in 2008. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2012) do not code countries with populations below one million. We categorize nine countries with populations between 500,000 and one million according to the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz coding scheme and code them based on the rules outlined in our paper. The countries are Bahrain, Bhutan, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Qatar, and Solomon Islands.
II. Additional Descriptive Statistics
Our unit of analysis is the state-year. We exclude state-years in which the countries did not vote at the UNGA, the first year of observation for every country, and years in which the country was led by an interim leader. This leaves 7,049 state-years from a total of 165 countries. The average number of leader transitions per country is 6.7 with a standard deviation of 5.4. Some countries experience no leader transitions throughout the entire period under observation and one country changed its leader 29 times (Italy). The mean number of SOLS changes in the sample is 3.9 with a standard deviation of 3.7, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 19. Robustness Check # 3: Including Interim Leaders (fn. 6) Our main analysis drops interim leaders since these do not represent any particular segment of society and are typically placed in office to maintain the status quo. Note that according to our coding rules, we do not code any leader who stays in power more than 18 months as interim. These are short term leaders who serve only until a new regular government is selected to resume active policymaking. In the analysis below we include interim leaders. Interim leaders are categorically coded as "other leader transitions".
(1) Robustness Check # 4: December Leaders (fn.5) As discussed in the manuscript, in leader transition years, we code the second leader as being in charge of the country's UNGA voting unless that leader came to power in December, in which case the predecessor is coded as in office during the UNGA session. If there were multiple leader changes we code the leader in November in power. To ensure that these coding decisions do not affect our results we ran analyses excluding years in which a leader assumed office in December as well as the subsequent year.
(1) Robustness Check # 7: Changes in Capabilities According to realist theory, countries pursue foreign policies that reflect their standing in the international balance of power. States that gain or lose power may pursue different policies than they did previously. To capture this idea, we control for the logged absolute value of the percentage change in the countries' composite indicator of national capability (CINC) score from t-1 to t (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 Robustness Check # 8: Changes in GDP per capita Economic downturns or booms might lead to changes in UNGA voting patterns. Thus, we control for the logged absolute value of the percentage change in a country's GDP per capita from t-1 to t. The GDP per capita measure is based on Gleditsch's Expanded Trade and GDP data v. 4.1 (Gleditsch 2002) . These data are available from 1950 onwards.
(1) 
Robustness Check # 11: Archigos Irregular Leader Transitions
We examine whether the relationship between SOLS change, democracy, and UNGA vote change holds when leaders who entered office through irregular means are excluded. We rely on Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009 ) to identify irregular entries and drop all observations in which the current leader's entry into office occurred in an irregular manner or through foreign imposition. Because Archigos only covers years through 2004, we lose the last four years of our observation period. Below see a) a re-analysis of our models excluding cases of irregular entry and b) some descriptive statistics on the relationship between irregular entry and our core independent variables.
(1) The non-SOLS change irregular entry in a democracy is the 2000 entry into office of Peruvian President Gustavo Noboa, who was affiliated with the same party as his predecessor. Noboa was the Vice President in his predecessor's regime and in the regular constitutional order succeeded the presidency after his predecessor was removed in a military coup.
